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THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KENYA￿S MAASAILAND: 










This paper explores the puzzle of why the pastoral Maasai of Kajiado, Kenya, supported the 
individualization of their collectively held group ranches, an outcome that is inconsistent with 
theoretical expectation. Findings suggest that individuals and groups will seek to alter property 
rights in their anticipation of net gains from a new assignment, even as they seek to eliminate 
disadvantages that were present in the status quo property rights structure. Heightened 
perceptions of impending land scarcity, failures of collective decision making, the promise of 
new income opportunities and the possibility of accessing capital markets motivated individuals 
to support group ranch subdivision. More importantly individuals were confronted with a 
declining security of tenure over their lands. Their supporting a transition to individual rights 
also represents a rational response anticipated to secure land claims against unauthorized 
appropriations by both Maasai and non-Maasai elite. Given the differentiated structure of group 
ranch communities, the costs and benefits of property transformation were unevenly distributed. 
The political process yielded beneficial outcomes for those with access to decision making, while 
creating vulnerabilities for those with less access such as women, the youth and poor herders. 
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KENYA￿S 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores current processes of property rights transformation in 
Kenya￿s Maasailand. It addresses the puzzle of why Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado 
District of southwestern Kenya are supporting the subdivision of their collectively held 
group ranches
2 into individual, titled parcels.  
Viewed against the backdrop of Maasai pastoral livelihoods that have evolved in 
conditions of climatic variability and resource heterogeneity, the decision to subdivide is 
puzzling.  Rainfall over most of Kajiado district is low, between 400-500mm (about 16-
20 inches) each year and variably distributed across space and time. The mobility of 
Maasai herds allows for maximum and equitable exploitation of patchily distributed 
water and pasture.  
Subdivision of collective holdings, their parcellation and subsequent distribution 
among individuals may more severely impede mobility, which is a vital component of 
livestock production systems under conditions of variability (Bruce and Mearns 2002; 
Niamir-Fuller 1999, 1998, 1995; Mehta at al 1999; Behnke and Scoones 1993; Sandford 
                                                 
1 Post-doctoral Fellow, CAPRi, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.   
e.mwangi@cgiar.  
2 Early experiments with land tenure reforms in Kenya￿s rangelands were group ranches in Maasai
 territory 
in the late 1960s and 70s.  A group ranch is land that has been demarcated and legally allocated to a group 
such as a tribe, a clan, section, family or other group of persons (Kenya, Republic of, 1968b). The group 
ranch is composed of a body of members to whom legal title has been jointly awarded, and a management 
committee that is elected by the body of members. The management committee is responsible for 
coordinating and implementing development projects on the group ranch. Although land is held in common 
by all group members, certain rights such as residency rights are assigned to individuals. The group as a 




1983). Reduced mobility will likely magnify vulnerability to drought and may jeopardize 
the viability of the livestock enterprise upon which pastoral livelihoods are dependent 
(Van der Brink et al. 1995). In the longer run, it may also undermine the reproduction of 
the pastoral culture (Kituyi 1990; Doherty 1987). No doubt the Maasai are aware of this.  
But then why do they still pursue the subdivision of group ranches? Unlike 
previous division of land in this area, when donor sponsored, government-driven 
initiatives carved out group and some individual ranches from the open, undivided 
Maasai range, the clamor for subdivision and individualization of these past two decades 
has emerged from within the Maasai community itself (Southgate and Hulme 2000; 
Kimani and Pickard 1998; Woodhouse 1997; Blewett 1995; Galaty 1994; Rutten 1992; 
Kituyi 1990).  
Why would the Maasai pursue a seemingly ￿irrational￿ system in the face of a 
more rational alternative such as group ownership? This is a concern shared by many 
scholars who puzzle at why seemingly perverse property rights persist in the face of what 
would appear to be obvious alternatives. The property rights approach offers a dynamic 
explanation for the conditions under which private property develops (Eggerttsson 1990; 
North and Thomas 1981, 1977, 1973; Demsetz 1967), and the mechanisms that define the 
process of transition (Platteau 2000; Firmin-Sellers 1996; Knight 1992; Libecap 1989).  
This paper first lays out in greater detail the framework that will be used to 
analyze individuals￿ motivations for supporting the subdivision of their collective 
holdings. It then briefly outlines the methods used and provides some background to the 
study area, after which it discusses the rationale for group ranching. This section also 
discusses the results of prior work on the evolution of group ranching in Kajiado district.  
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The final sections present this study￿s findings and discusses their significance in relation 
to explanations provided by property rights scholars.  
 
2.  THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Certain conditions within the socio-economic sphere may motivate individuals 
and groups to seek to privatize/individualize property rights in land. These conditions 
may create a situation in which individuals and groups perceive the benefits anticipated 
in the new, individualized structure as outweighing the costs of transforming the old one 
and of maintaining the new structure. A change in relative factor and product prices is 
one such condition (Demsetz 1967; North and Thomas 1973; North 1990). An increase in 
product prices may for example push up land values. Individuals will then demand and 
invest in changing property rights towards greater exclusivity as they anticipate capturing 
the attendant gains. To them, the resulting gains outweigh the costs of initiating, 
transforming and enforcing the new property rights structure. In areas closer to markets, 
these processes of transformation will be particularly pronounced as the higher rents to be 
gained precipitate intense competition (Alston et al. 1995).  
Demographic pressures, perceptions of scarcity and common-pool resource losses 
may also motivate individuals to seek alternative property rights structures. As 
populations increase on a relatively unchanging land resource base, perceptions of 
scarcity may set in motion demands for exclusive property rights as individuals attempt 
to eliminate uncertainty with regard to future shares in the collective holdings (Ostrom 
2001; Platteau 2000 1996, 1995; Boserup 1965). Perceptions of scarcity are rendered 
acute if accompanied by deterioration in the physical condition of the resource (Libecap  
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1989). Actors in this situation may thus seek to transform property rights in order to 
mitigate losses that occur within the shared domain in order to realize the gains of 
individual management.  
The demand for exclusive property rights does not occur within an economic 
vacuum. Often actors in government will supply services such as surveys, registration, 
titling, and enforcement crucial for the integrity of formal, individualized property rights. 
The incentives of individual government agents are important, as they will often seek to 
supply property rights when the transformation promises gains to themselves and/or their 
associates (North 1990; Feeny 1989). Active state involvement in land transformation is 
often justified under the guise of promoting (economic) ￿development,￿ or safeguarding 
the management and conservation of natural resources or enhancing equity in resource 
distribution. 
This paper uses the framework outlined above to explore the puzzle of why group 
ranch members supported the individualization of their collective holdings. It discusses 
individual and group calculations underlying the decision to subdivide and the context in 
which these decisions were made.  The incentives of a diversity of actors, differentiated 
according to age, gender and wealth, and their interactions is analyzed.  There is an 
attempt to account for the ￿wave￿ of subdivision in which separate, seemingly 
autonomous group ranch units, resolved to subdivide at roughly the same time i.e. 




3.  THE STUDY SITES AND METHODS 
Kajiado district is located on the southern tip of the Rift Valley province, one of 
Kenya￿s eight provinces (Figure1). Most of the studies on group ranch subdivision were 
mainly conducted in the Keekonyokie and Kaputiei areas of northern and eastern Kajiado 
district, which are generally closer to Nairobi (Kenya￿s capital city), are ethnically 
diverse and receive higher rainfall totals relative to other parts of the district. These areas 
represent no more than 8 percent of the district. Very few studies have been conducted in 
the more arid areas that are more representative of the district and which are also fairly 
distant from Nairobi. The results of these prior studies suggest that closeness to major 
cities and towns, high populations of immigrant cultivating communities and high 
agricultural potential are important conditions for the drive towards subdivision and 
increased privatization in Kajiado district.  
But what of the rest of Kajiado, where these conditions hardly hold and where 
there is still pressure to subdivide? The sites selected for this study are an attempt to 
represent conditions different from those in the above-mentioned cases, i.e. conditions 
that are reflective of the situation over most of the district.  
The four study sites were selected from one ecological zone, where the conditions 
of soils, vegetation, geology and rainfall as well as ethnic composition are relatively 
homogeneous. Four group ranches were selected: Enkaroni group ranch area, Meto group 
ranch area, Nentanai group ranch area and Torosei group ranch (Figure 2). These were 
selected to include variations in size and location, in proximity to main the main livestock 
marketing center of Bissel, and in how far along each was in the subdivision process (See 
Table 1 below).  Because of reduced transportation costs, land closer to markets tend to  
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have higher values, creating greater incentives for creating and formalizing ownership 
and individuals. Larger group ranches with many members, on the other hand, more 
likely face higher costs of organizing for change.  
 













# of titles 
Issued by 




Enkaroni  April 1975  11,378  356  May 1988  310  8 (5miles) 
Meto  December 
1977 
28,928  645  Sept 1989  400  65 (40) 
Nentanai   December 
1977 
3696  57  March 1987  42  18 (11) 
Torosei  June 1977  45,44  300  Sept 1989  -  56 (35) 
 
 
Fieldwork was conducted over a one-year period from January 2001 to January 
2002. A second and complementary phase of fieldwork was conducted from June to 
August of 2002. The first part of the 2001 fieldwork was focused on administering 
interviews. These interviews were designed to find out why individuals supported 
subdivision,  which category of individuals were most or least in favor of subdivision and 
why, as well as taking a look at the evolution of group ranch membership rules. For 
Torosei group ranch, which had not formally subdivided by the time fieldwork, a slight 
variant of the original survey instrument included questions intended to reflect reasons 
why this group ranch delayed subdividing yet members resolved to subdivide about the 
same time as with the other group ranches of Enkaroni and Meto.  
A total of 334 interviews were conducted across different categories of elders, the 
youths, married women and widows for all four study sites. The table below provides a  
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breakdown of these respondents by group ranch and social category. The proportion of 
general membership, interviewed in each group ranch is as follows: 
 
  No. of Members  No. of Members 
Interviewed  % Interviewed 
Enkaroni 356  48  13 
Meto 645  88  14 
Nentanai  57 30 53 
Torosei 300  64  21 
 
These varying sample proportions reflect disparities in the number of localized 
settlements within each group ranch, and tend to be higher where a group ranch had a 
larger number of settlement areas or localities owing to its larger size, as in the case of 
Torosei group ranch. Nentanai is a unique case because it had a total of only 57 registered 
members, 30 of who were interviewed. 
 
THE MAASAI GROUP RANCHES 
Why Group Ranches? 
Group Ranches were primarily intended to foster the commercialization of Maasai 
livestock management systems and to transform land into an economic good subject to 
free buying and selling. The program entailed a shift in land tenure and organization from 
one under which the range was under common ownership, to an abridged version of the 
original commons, variable in size and membership, but held under corporate title.  
The transformation was envisaged to be simpler, with lower costs and tax rates 
under a special new Act, the Group (Land Representatives) Act, than under corporate 
law. Group ranching was also envisaged to facilitate the commoditization of Maasai 
herds and lands without creating a large pool of landless individuals. Paradoxically, it  
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was also envisioned to provide an evolutionary mode of transformation that would be 
based on the traditional ways of the Maasai. 
The Land Adjudication Act of June 1968 facilitated the creation of group ranches 
(Kenya Republic 1968a). It provided for the recording of rights and interests in 
customary lands, and their assignment to their customary users. The Land (Group 
Representatives) Act on the other hand provided for the governance and administration of 
group ranches. Under the Land (Group Representatives) Act, every member of the group 
ranch is deemed to share in the ownership of group land in equal, undivided shares. And 
each is entitled to reside in group land with family and dependents (Kenya Republic 
1968b). Each group ranch is required to elect its group representatives who are expected 
to ensure that the rights of any person under recognized customary law are safeguarded in 
so far as that is compatible with the operations of the group. They are also authorized to 
hold property on behalf of, and to act on behalf of and for the collective benefit of all 
members of the group.  The Act empowers the group to craft its own rules regarding the 
running of its own affairs such as procedures for the administration of its property, the 
registration of new members, and the disbursement of funds for group projects.  Each 
group is required to hold a general meeting of its members every year. All group 
members are entitled to attend these meetings and to vote in them. No business should be 
transacted at a meeting of a group unless at least 60 percent of the members of the group 
are present at the meeting. Further, a resolution of the group must be supported by the 
votes of at least 60 percent of the members of the group present at the meeting. 
Out of the group representatives, a committee is to be elected by open ballot each 
year at the group￿s annual general meeting. The committee comprises a Chair, Vice  
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Chair, Secretary, Treasurer and 3 other members of whom at least 2 are elected from the 
group representatives. The committee is required to assist and encourage members to 
manage the land or graze their stock in accordance with sound principles of land use, 
range management, animal husbandry and commercial practice. The last item in the Act 
provides for dissolving the group ranch. This can only occur following a written 
application signed by a majority of the group representatives.  
To implement this development program, the Kenyan government sought loans 
and grants from international agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, the Swedish Aid 
agency, Canadian Development Agency and the United Kingdom. The loans were 
granted under the auspices of the Kenya Livestock Development Program (KLDP). The 
Department of Land Adjudication and the Registrar of Group Representatives, both in the 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement, were extensively involved in the initial establishment 
of group ranches. The Range Management division of the Ministry of Agriculture played 
a key role in drawing up group ranch development plans. The Ministry of Water 
Development coordinated water development. The Agricultural Finance Corporation 
administered the loans provided by the donors.  
The first group ranches to be adjudicated in Kajiado District were in the Kaputiei 
section of eastern Kajiado. Here, 14 ranches averaging 1900 ha, with about 100 families 
each were established in the latter part of the 1960s (Davis 1970). In some northern areas 
of Kajiado district however some individuals rejected group ranches and were instead 
given individual tenure to holdings of usually less than 100 ha (Grandin 1987). A total of 




Why did the Kenya Government and the Ordinary Maasai Accept the Concept of Group 
Ranching? 
The Kenya government needed to increase the low levels of productivity 
associated with subsistence pastoral practices in order to supply growing urban 
populations with reasonably priced meat. Group ranching schemes appeared to offer an 
efficient means of utilizing development loans to bring pastoral regions into commercial 
production. Group-based schemes were expected to enjoy economies of scale for the 
provision of infrastructure such as livestock dips, water and roads. For group ranches, 
capital costs per unit of ranch area were estimated to be only about one third of those for 
individual ranches (Grandin 1986). Group ranches were already fully stocked by the 
members￿ privately owned cattle and there was no need to provide funds for ranch 
employees. The group ranch option also seemed to offer the possibility of developing 
pastoral lands without making pastoralists landless. This was a major concern since 
similar programs to individualize communal lands in the high potential Kikuyu areas 
resulted in landlessness and political unrest. Famine relief was also increasing becoming 
a burden and a political embarrassment to the Kenya government. Inputs through the 
project were anticipated to lower the need for famine relief activities (Jahnke et al. 1972), 
while stabilized ranching was expected to provide a better opportunity to control 
overgrazing. 
And why did the ordinary Maasai accept group ranches? Although the Maasai did 
not accept or even understand some features of the group ranch such as grazing quotas, 
boundary maintenance and the management committee they accepted the idea of group 
ranches primarily because it afforded them protection against further land appropriation 
from government, against the incursion of non-Maasai and  from a land grab by the elite  
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Maasai (Fratkin 1994; Campbell 1991; Galaty 1980; Goldschmidt 1980; Hopcraft 1980; 
Halderman 1972; Hedlund 1971).  The history of Maasailand since the late 1800s has 
been one of dispossession (Tignor 1976; Sandford 1919). In 1904 and 1911 the Maasai 
were eveicted from alarge chunk of their northern territory by the Colonial administration 
to create space for the settlement of  European immigrants whose agricultural and other 
commercial activities were anticipated to power economic development in the new 
Kenya Colony. In response to settlers￿ demands, private, individually owned farms and 
commercial ranches were formed in these areas. Maasai contestation over the 
appropriation of these lands were unsuccessful. 1904 and 1911 represent the first wave of 
land alienation from the Maasai who were relocated to reservations in the south, where 
they currently reside. These southern areas were either too small or too arid to support 
transhumant pastoralism or just simply inhospitable; the northern boundary of this 
reserve was drawn to exclude the most valuable water supplies, which were included in 
the land alienated to the Europeans.  
The Kenya Land Commission of 1932 which was mandated with evaluating 
current and future land needs of the African population, to determine whether it was 
feasible to set aside more land for African communities and to evaluate African land 
claims over land alienated to non-natives, did not find favorably for the Maasai (Kenya 
Colony and Protectorate 1933). This Commission held that the Maasai occupied Kenya￿s 
best pastoral land, were Kenya￿s wealthiest tribe, and had sufficient land to meet their 
needs and more, and instead they should be forced to lease out their land to other 
communities, particularly the cultivators. This would bring tsetse-infested areas into 
cultivation and it would help relieve overcrowding in other African areas, particularly in  
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the Kikuyu Reserve. The passing of the National Parks Ordinance in 1945 paved the way 
for the second wave of land alienation, primarily to promote wildlife conservation and 
tourism through of National Parks, Game Reserves and Game Conservation Areas. A 
total of   25792 Km
2 was further carved out which constituted dry-season highland or 
swamplands and salt licks that are strategic resources for the sustenance of Maasai 
livestock management systems (Kituyi 1990).  These series of recent historical events 
created a political risk of outsiders appropriating Maasai lands. More recently still, 
population pressures in the high potential areas of the country resulted in infiltration of 
immigrants into Maasailand (Fratkin 1994).  
Group ranch development also carried with it the promise of water development 
in the form of dams and boreholes, as well as the promise of improved livestock 
husbandry through introduction of dipping facilities and regular vaccination against 
prevalent animal diseases (Davis 1970).  
It is now widely accepted that group ranches failed to meet their intended 
objectives. Barely ten years after their creation there were demands for their dissolution 
and subsequent division into individual, titled units for distribution among registered 
members. This disintegration began as early as the mid-1970s to early 1980s for the 
Kaputiei ranches of north eastern Kajiado district. Demands for subdivision in other parts 
of the district gained momentum between 1984 and 1996. By 1985, 22 group ranches had 
resolved to subdivide; 7 went ahead and subdivided (Munei 1987). By 1996, 22 group 
ranches had actually subdivided and individual land titles begun to be issued (Kimani and 
Pickard 1998). 11 other group ranches were in various stages of subdivision. By 2000, 31 
group ranches had subdivided and been issued with titles. 14 others had resolved to  
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subdivide and were being surveyed and demarcated. Only 12 had resisted subdivision. 
What fueled the increased demands for subdivision?  
 
SUBDIVIDING THE GROUP RANCH: MEMBERS￿ MOTIVATIONS 
Presidential Exhortations and the Call to Subdivide 
The turning point in the race to subdivide group ranches in the Maasai districts of 
Narok and Kajiado came when Kenya￿s President Moi on several occasions between 
1983 and 1989 voiced his support for the process. In 1983, President Moi, speaking at a 
fund drive in neighboring Narok district, urged members of group ranches to subdivide 
(Daily Nation, 7/19/1983; Kenya Times, 7/19/1983). He stressed the need for individuals 
to develop their own pieces of land. Noting the unviability of group ranch operations, he 
expressed the fear that group ranches may in future spark ￿trouble￿ because registered 
members were inviting their friends to reside in the group ranches. Two years later 
President Moi reiterated his call for subdivision in Trans Mara district. Here he advised 
Maasai leaders to begin land adjudication to enable each family to develop its own farm 
(Kenya Times, 3/9/1985). In 1986 the Narok District Commissioner announced that all 
group ranches in his district were dissolved according to the wishes of all members, and 
that private, individual ownership would now make it possible for individuals to farm the 
land (Daily Nation, 8/7/1986).  
Kajiado district joined the fray in 1987, when political and civic leaders resolved 
that all group ranches in Kajiado district be subdivided equally among their respective 
members on the basis of the ￿family￿ unit (Daily Nation, 1/23/1987). Speaking at another 
fund raising event in Kajiado town, President Moi directed that all loans given to dairy 
farmers in Kajiado district by the Agricultural Finance Corporation be written off owing  
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to the fact that cattle died in the 1984 drought and farmers consequently had no means 
through which to repay their loans (Daily Nation 4/15/1989). The President also directed 
that the process of group ranch subdivision be speeded up so that owners of parcels could 
get title deeds to their land.  
The President￿s encouragement for subdivision, likely originating from pressures 
within Maasailand itself, had two effects. First, it fostered a grudging acceptance of 
subdivision from within the ranks of a reluctant bureaucracy that had been advocating 
greater caution in the subdivision of group ranches. Second, it served to cap local debates 
on the issue. Group ranch members in Kajiado district began to vote for the dissolution 
and subsequent subdivision of their group ranches. The four group ranches studied in this 
research, consistent with the general trend in the district, resolved to subdivide in 1987 
1988 and two in 1989.  
A second issue that President Moi touched on was the ￿rescheduling￿ and eventual 
writing off of loans borrowed from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. Though this 
was likely intended to benefit the elite individual ranchers, who had experienced 
extensive livestock losses in the 1984 drought, it appears to have been broadly interpreted 
to apply to group ranches as well. As a result, those group ranches that, owing to loan 
encumbrances, had been denied consent to subdivide by the Registrar of group ranches, 
were now free to start subdividing their land. These group ranches had earlier taken loans 
for the implementation of group ranch projects and were prevented from subdividing 
because they had not completed paying off their loans. By tipping public opinion in favor 
of subdividing, by supporting the ￿rescheduling￿ of loans taken by ranchers, and by  
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overriding a reluctant bureaucracy, the President￿s policy endorsement may have 
accounted for the apparent ￿wave￿ among group ranches to subdivide. 
Prior to the President￿s announcements, government officials from the 
Departments of Lands Adjudication and Range Planners from the Ministry of Livestock 
Development were cautious and indeed stopped short of openly discouraging group 
ranches against subdivision. According to the minutes of the annual general meeting at 
Enkaroni group ranch of  26
th February 1985
3, for example, the registrar of group ranches 
emphasized ￿the grave consequences of ranch subdivision without basic infrastructure.￿ 
At the same meeting, the Range Officer noted that ￿it was unfortunate that members￿ 
wish to subdivide the group ranch would result in unviable units which would be 
expensive to develop because of their small sizes.￿ He further pointed out that if the land 
were partitioned equally, each member would be entitled to 79 acres (34 hectares) in 
which one would be able to keep no more than 7 head of cattle. Present also was the 
District Land Adjudication Officer who strongly reiterated the inordinate expenses of 
individual parcel management and requested members to reconsider their decision. The 
President￿s pronouncement thus served to silence the bureaucracy, forcing it into action 
where previously it was unwilling.  Government surveyors were assigned to the process, 
while range officers from the Ministry of Livestock Development and Planning were 
enlisted to ensure that subdivided parcels were viable. 
It must be recognized however that official sanction for subdivision came at a 
time when most group ranch members had seen the necessity to subdivide. Records for 
the group ranches studied indicate that there had been considerable debates on the merits 
                                                 
3 Meetings File: Enkaroni group ranch, District Land Adjudication Office, Kajiado District.  
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and demerits of subdivision prior to the President￿s 1989 encouragement. Minutes of 
Enkaroni group ranch meetings in February and May of 1985 had as their sole agendas 
discussions on the merits and demerits of subdivision
4. Not all meetings and debates were 
recorded. Those that did not occur under the auspices of a formal annual general meeting 
of members, such as those organized through the local chief￿s administrative umbrella i.e. 
the local baraza, were not recorded in writing. Such barazas were numerous in each of 
the group ranches in the run up to subdivision. 
If the President￿s remarks merely quickened the pace of decision making, and if 
the bureaucracy was not actively encouraging group ranches to subdivide, what is it that 
motivated group ranch members to subdivide? In the next section I show the complement 
of factors that drove individuals￿ preferences for subdivision.   
Table 2 below illustrates individual preferences for subdivision according to age 
set and status for each group ranch. Table 3 goes further to list the various reasons that 
individuals cited for desiring to have their group ranches subdivided. These reasons are 
provided for each group ranch and also aggregated across all group ranches. The figures 
in these tables in addition to more extended explanations offered by each individual in 
their interview session, form the basis for analysis and discussion in the following 
sections. All figures in Tables 2 and 3 relate to registered members of the group ranch 
whose membership status conferred upon each of them rights to decision making. They 
each received individual parcels upon group ranch subdivision.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Meetings File: Enkaroni Group Ranch. Department of Land Adjudication, Kajiado District.  
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POPULATION INCREASE AND A STATIC RESOURCE BASE 
Fundamental to the reason to subdivide across the group ranches studied of 
Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai and Torosei were members￿ concerns with increasing human 
numbers in the context of a fixed, non-expanding land resource base. As young men 
matured, they were recruited into group membership. This recruitment commonly 
involved the collective registration of an entire age set. Members￿ shares to group ranch 
land were gradually diminishing with the expansion of membership. The anticipated 
outcome was that parcels would be small and unviable upon the eventual subdivision of 
the group ranch, at some unknown though certain time in the future. This concern also 
reflects a general sense that land subdivision was unavoidable; a sense that is tied to 
events in Kajiado district and elsewhere in Kenya.  
Tables 4 and 5 present population figures for each group ranch for the past 20 
years and incorporate three population census data. Table 6 gives an indication of new 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4--Number of members in each group ranch in three time periods 
Ranch  1982 1984 2002* 
Enkaroni  190 336 356 
Meto  408 425 645 
Nentanai  51 51 56 
Torosei  165 165 300 
*For the subdivided group ranches, the year 2002 refers to number of members that were eventually registered and 
to whom land was allocated. 
Source: District Land Adjudication Office, Kajiado District. 
 
Table 5--Total population in the study areas 
Name of Location*  1979  1989  1999  2002 Projection at 
4.5% Growth Rate 
  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Enkaroni **  **  731  757  1209  1340  1384  1534 
Meto  1629 1766 2401 2551 2529 2511 2895 2875 
Nentanai  Village  ** ** ** ** 192  234  210  268 
Bissil  **  **  1922 1878 4567 4851 5229 5554 
Torosei  1696 1607 987  897  1209 1340 1384 1534 
* Each of the locations coincides with a group ranch, except Nentanai which falls under Ilbissil location. 
**Data not available. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning (2001b 1994, 1981). 
 
Table 6--Number of individuals registered  
Group Ranch  Registrations* 
Enkaroni 1984:  89  registered 





Torosei 1985:  117 
* These are in addition to those registered when the group ranches were first incorporated in the 1970s. 
Source: Group Ranch Meetings Files, Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai, Torosei. Department of Land Adjudication, 




By the time the studied group ranches of Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai and Torosei were 
debating whether or not to subdivide, many group ranches in Kajiado were engaged in the same 
discussion while others such as those in Kaputiei and in Ngong divisions had already subdivided 
about a decade earlier or were at advanced stages. This general tendency towards 
individualization can be seen in other parts of Kenya such as amongst the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kisii, 
and Kipsigis communities who neighbor the Maasai and whose land is now held under individual 
title. 
The links between increasing numbers of registered group ranch members and 
accompanying perceptions of land scarcity is reflected in the ever more stringent rules for 
recruiting individuals into group membership. In all the group ranches studied, registration began 
with the combined registration of the Ilterito, the Ilnyankusi, the Iseuri, and the Ilkiseiya  age sets 
at the time when group ranches were formed (See Annex I for age set chronology in the study 
areas). In Meto and Enkaroni group ranch areas, recruitment of new members ended with the 
registration of the Irang Irang age set in 1984 and the register was ￿closed￿ to any future member 
recruitment. More junior age sets found the register closed and were shut out. Their inclusion 
would have reduced the share of group land available to each registered member. In Nentanai 
group ranch, which is Kajiado￿s smallest, even the relatively more senior Irang Irang age set was 
not registered! 
When the group ranches were first carved out of vast open Maasai territory the intent was 
to register those families that resided in specific areas and who held claim to that particular 
territory. This first registration of group ranch members registered male household heads and 
some of their young male sons. Very few non-Maasai from Kikuyu, Kamba, Somali and Wa-




employed as cultivators and/or traders and were affiliated to local Maasai either through 
marriage or friendship and had been incorporated into Maasai socio-cultural structure through 
age set and clan institutions.  
Apart from residency and being male, there were no other restrictions in the first few 
years following the establishment of group ranches. Later years however limited eligibility to a 
set of criteria. An individual thus had to have been born and raised within the group ranch, had to 
have been initiated into adulthood according to Maasai custom, had to be endorsed by the entire 
membership during annual general meetings, had to possess a national identity card and had to 
pay a registration fee. These rules were ultimately negated with the closing of the register of 
members when each group ranch resolved to subdivide.  
Closing the register of members locked out eligible males such as the IrangIrang in 
Nentanai, the Ilking￿onde in Enkaroni and Meto and the Ilkishili in Torosei. Women, who were 
excluded right from the inception of the group ranches, could only be registered as widows, and 
then only after the insistence of government officials. More strictly enforced rules of eligibility 
to membership are just part of a wider exclusion mechanism. Questions of identity and belonging 
also emerged when group ranch members resolved to subdivide. Members and their committees 
undertook painstaking effort to verify the identity of those registered. In Meto group ranch for 
example, the wa-Arusha, migrant laborers from Tanzania, were struck off the register because 
they were of Tanzanian nationality. Similarly, individuals whose names were doubly registered 
in Meto as well as in the registers of adjacent group ranches were struck off one register. 
Multiple registrations of an individual within one group ranch register under different names was 
also corrected for.  Exclusion was thus a prime theme in group ranch subdivision. In earlier times 




identity, i.e. whether one was Kenyan Maasai or not and/or whether one belonged to one group 
ranch or the other became the basis of exclusion. These efforts at exclusion fed off notions and 




6 RANCHERS: LAND TITLES, LAND GRABBING AND 
COMPETITIVE GRAZING  
Most individual ranches were established in the early1960s to early 1970s. Individual 
ranches were a tactical scheme in the broader plan to commercialize land and livestock 
production in Maasailand, as an off shoot of earlier government policies-the Kenya Land 
Commission of 1932 and the Swynnerton Plan of 1955. Because the individual ranchers were to 
be used as a model for the rest of the Maasai to emulate, conditions were created to ensure their 
success. Low-interest credit for the purchase of superior breeds and the construction of on- farm 
infrastructure such as boreholes, water pans was availed through the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation. This was part of World Bank Financing to Kenya￿s Livestock sector under the 
Kenya Livestock Development Program. The individual ranchers also had support from livestock 
extension officers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development. The first 
individual ranch was established as early as 1954 (Campbell 1993). By 1963, 24 individual 
ranches had been created (Rutten 1992). In 1965, 28 more individual ranches were established in 
the Kaputiei area to the east of Kajiado district (Hedlund 1971). These took up about 7 percent of 
the entire land held territorially by the Kaputiei Maasai. Adjudication first began in higher 
potential and better watered areas of Kajiado district such as Ngong division in the north and 
                                                 
6 An individual ranch is a production enterprise in which an individual member of a ￿tribal￿ society may, with 






Loitikotok to the south on the foothills of Mt Kilimanjaro. The first owners of individual ranches 
were all Maasai, but ￿Maasai with a difference￿ (Simpson 1973). They included politicians, local 
chiefs, local store keepers, government officials as well as cattle traders i.e. wealthy and/or 
influential individuals with ties to the administration.  
Using their land titles as collateral individual ranchers had access to development loans 
from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. They also had access to extension services from 
relevant government departments such as the Ministry of Livestock and Water Development. 
IndeedMany constructed permanent stone houses, put up temporary and permanent watering 
facilities, increased the quantity and improved the quality of their herds. They appeared 
successful. With time group ranch members, who were faced with increasing challenges to 
collective decision-making began to see in individual ranching a reasonable and viable 
alternative. They were eager to access these loan facilities and achieve similar success.  
The individual title was viewed as the gateway to development.  A title to land 
represented complete and secure ownership, but more. It could be used as collateral to acquire 
loans for farm and livestock improvement; it could be used as security against which unforeseen 
circumstances such as illness could be confronted. For the poor in particular, individual 
ownership represented not only their extrication from a grazing interaction in which they were 
exploited, but also an opportunity to manage their livestock in harmony with pasture availability; 
an ability to earn alternative incomes either by leasing out excess pastures, cultivating, selling 
charcoal, and in extreme cases, selling off part of their land. With individuation, the poor would 
become property owners and have access to alternative productive resources that would enable 




The success of the individual ranchers and group members￿ envy of it must be qualified. 
To some group ranchers, the very creation of individual ranches in the late 1960s and early 70s 
was the equivalent of a land grab in which huge chunks of the community￿s land were hived off 
and transferred to exclusive individual use without the community￿s consent. There remained a 
niggling fear that this land grabbing might renew itself and the remaining parts of the group 
ranch might be taken in much the same way. 
The members of Enkaroni group ranch viewed individual ranchers as a menace. Though 
some may have admired and even envied the ￿development￿ exemplified by individual ranchers, 
most group members had more reason to resent than to admire the individual ranchers￿ successes 
in the livestock enterprise because it occurred at their expense. Individual ranchers would release 
their livestock to graze in  group ranch pastures during the wet season and retreat into their 
fenced and exclusive ranches in the dry, while denying group members the use of their ranches 
during this time. The individual ranchers were in effect using the group ranch as a wet season 
grazing area and setting aside their own land as dry season grazing areas i.e. olopololis. These 
olopololis were exclusive, accessible only to the individual ranch owners themselves.  
Thus the individual ranchers￿ ￿successes￿, in a crude sense, achieved one of the goals that 
had driven the establishment of individual ranches in Kajiado district: to act as a model that 
could be replicated by the wider Maasai community. But this demonstration effect was 
counterbalanced by their exploitative grazing on surrounding group lands. It was also offset by 
perceptions amongst some group members that the individual ranchers represented a land grab. 
These latter situations generated resentment rather than envy. All three reasons - demonstration 
effects, exploitative grazing and land grab - appeared to motivate interest in the subdivision of 





LIVESTOCK HOLDINGS AND GRAZING INTERACTIONS INSIDE THE GROUP RANCH 
Herds within the group ranch were a conglomeration of livestock belonging to both 
livestock-poor and livestock-rich individuals. Livestock ownership was not factored into pasture 
availability and all group members grazed on the same pastures. Livestock-poor individuals were 
discontented with this arrangement, as it did not differentiate between the pasture demands of 
different members with varying livestock holdings. They felt that they were subsidizing the 
livestock enterprise of the rich, with no apparent gain to themselves. This was particularly 
evident in the drought periods when all livestock belonging to both rich and poor would be 
forced to migrate out of the group ranch after exhausting available pasture. These migrations 
would result in substantial herd losses. Losses were particularly acute for the poor who, having 
set off with only a few cattle, would often return with none. Livestock poor individuals were thus 
bearing the costs of collective herding, yet the benefits were concentrated among the wealthy 
few. These grazing differentials amongst group ranch members themselves dovetailed with the 
exploitative tendencies of the individual ranchers and pushed group members into viewing 
subdivision as a desirable alternative. With subdivision, each individual would acquire his own 
parcel and be forced to manage his pastures according to the number of cattle that he owned.  
 
CHALLENGES WITH COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING IN THE GROUP RANCH 
The group ranch committee members were particularly sensitive to difficulties in 
collective decision-making. This group of 10 individuals, elected from the wider group of ranch 
membership and mandated with tasks of running and overseeing all development efforts on the 




individuals to limit or reduce stock quantities as part of ranch management planning was 
difficult. Individuals own livestock under indigenous Maasai herd management and herd size is 
individually determined. The economic and symbolic value of cattle occasioned a focus on 
accumulation amongst rational herd owners. Milk is a crucial component of basic subsistence. 
Cattle are important for cementing social relationships either through bride wealth or stock 
exchanges among friends and relatives. They are also an insurance against droughts. The 
committee was unable to mediate against this strong set of incentives and to convince herd 
owners to reduce their herds. Without an agreement on a limit to herd size, the group ranch did 
face a tragedy of the commons. 
In addition to the uncontrolled accumulation of livestock by some group ranch members, 
the committee faced considerable defiance of their attempts to define and enforce grazing and 
settlement patterns within the group. Individuals would, for example, graze livestock in areas 
deferred for dry season grazing, or even construct homesteads in the same. Similarly group 
members would invite kin and friends to graze on group land without consulting the committee
7. 
Others would set wild fires to decimate tick infestations and to improve pastures. Yet still others 
were guilty of non-payment of their contributions for the financing of group projects such as 
water and schools.  
While most of these challenges were resolvable and some were actually resolved, for 
example by forcibly evicting unauthorized settlers or chasing away non-members, these solutions 
                                                 
7 This problem was particularly acute in Torosei group ranch and subdivision here was also seen as a way of cutting 
off members from other neighboring group ranches particularly Shompole (which is much more arid than Torosei) 
who would bring their herds during the dry season. After exhausting Torosei pastures, they together with Torosei 
members would all be forced to move into Tanzania. In good times some Shompole people would refuse to return to 
their homes and would have to be chased away, but their friends would invite them again. Even if they left, they 
would leave a large proportion of their livestock behind. The poor in Torosei were the most notorious for inviting 
their friends as they would benefit from milking their friends￿ herds. Group members felt that subdivision would 
help them get rid of this problem, as anyone who would invite their friend would have to bear the burden of 




were unattractive in the long run. The committee thus encouraged and even campaigned for 
subdivision as a way of divesting themselves of these responsibilities.  
Consequently, the group ranch committee members invested much effort in encouraging 
subdivision. They presented subdivision as a government required initiative, emphasizing 
President Moi￿s previous advice to the community. They also stirred deep-seated fears by 
suggesting that future, post-Moi governments may settle non-Maasai in the group ranches if left 
undivided. This may have played a pivotal role in hardening members￿ resolve to subdivide. This 
fear of immigrants and especially the Kikuyu must be contextualized. Though the wa-Kamba 
were rewarded for their role in the World War by being given land in parts of Northern and 
Western Kajiado, the Kikuyu were perceived as a bigger threat in spite of historical symbiotic 
Maasai-Kikuyu relations. Not only were the Kikuyu more numerous and economically stronger, 
but recent experiences of unfair land transactions in other parts of Maasailand have left Maasai 
suspicious of Kikuyus. Indeed, land remains a deeply emotive issue for the Maasai in their 
memory of the state￿s historical capacity to ruthlessly seize their land regardless of local 
community interests and in the wake of unequal land transactions with ￿market-savvy￿ outsiders.  
Clearly a multiplicity of factors underlies group ranch members￿ decisions to subdivide 
their collective holdings. The demand for exclusive, individual property rights in land follows 
quite closely economic and demographic predictions. An increasing human population heightens 
perceptions of scarcity while titles acquired after subdivision are envisioned to open up 
previously inaccessible opportunities. But also difficulties in enforcing rules for resource 
appropriation within the group ranch, and in excluding outsiders raise concerns over distribution. 
Members viewed subdivision and individualization as a decisive solution to distributional 




for subdivision. Such claims are validated by an historical examination of Maasai land relations 
(Mwangi 2003a).  
Though the preceding account has laid out factors that motivated demand for exclusive, 
individualized property rights, it is incomplete. It homogenizes a host of differentiated 
preferences amongst actors, and it obscures the concrete struggles, bargains and controversies 
that defined the decision making process. As illustrated below, this was a process that closely 
followed the age and gender differentiation of Maasai society and one that was characterized by 
conflicting agendas and disparate abilities by individuals to influence the nature and direction of 
change. An analysis of the preferences of individuals and groups of actors, and the ways in 
which they pressed their claims in the run up to subdivision greatly enhances the understanding 
of this dynamic process. It places in perspective the problem of why subdivision happened in the 
first place.  
The following section presents the heterogeneity of actors and interests in subdivision. It 
illustrates how these interests were articulated, mediated and tempered within the framework of a 
mix of formal-legal and customary institutions, to achieve the outcome of subdivision. 
 
DIFFERENTIAL PREFERENCES FOR SUBDIVISION AMONG GROUP RANCH 
MEMBERS 
In general Maasai society can be categorized into the elders, the ilmurran, the youth, the 
women and the children. Elders can further be disaggregated into three groups - junior, senior 
and retired elders. These categories of elders personify a power and authority structure that is 
entrenched in ritual, is defined by age and experience, and is given expression by decision-




Among the communities of Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai and Torosei group ranches, the 
senior most grouping of elders that featured prominently in the conversations on subdivision, 
belonged to the Ilterito and Ilnyankusi age sets. The Ilterito, if alive today, would be roughly 
between 85-100 yrs old, while the Ilnyankusi may be between 70 and 80 years old. The Iseuri 
may be about 60 to 70; the Ilkitoip (Ilkiseiya and IrangIrang) early 40s-late 50s; the Ilkingonde, 
mid-20s to late 30s￿and so on. The ilmurran are usually young men in their mid teens to mid-
20s and comprise the ￿warrior￿ group in the community. Women, like children, are dependents. 
They have little to no decision-making authority outside of the household.  
 
The Elders 
In Enkaroni the most senior elders during the time when subdivision decisions were 
being taken were the Ilterito and the Ilnyankusi. Individuals of these age sets were strongly 
opposed to subdivision. To them subdivision would reduce the amount of land available for 
livestock, leading to a reduction in the number of livestock ultimately resulting in poverty. 
Poverty would motivate individuals to sell parts of their land in their effort to survive. Such 
sales, if to outsiders, would result in the loss of Maasai land to non-Maasai. Restricted movement 
and ￿caging in￿ of individuals in their parcels would also undermine community cohesion. By 
contrast the senior Ilnyankusi of Meto and Nentanai group ranches strongly supported the 
subdivision of their group ranches. Later paragraphs in this section show the reason for this 
preference. 
Despite the senior elders￿ interjections, Enkaroni group ranch was still subdivided. 
Though Torosei group ranch resolved to subdivide it is still organizing for a formal survey and 
demarcation. In Enkaroni the elders￿ voices of dissent did not go unheeded judging by the 




Ilterito and Ilnyankusi here were however ineffective in pressing for their interest. They were 
few and kept dying off with time and as the debates progressed. The Ilterito in particular were 
too old and weak to leave their compounds and attend meetings, while many Ilnyankusi 
disgusted with the whole idea simply refused to attend meetings convened to discuss subdivision. 
When the matter was taken to a vote
8 amongst group members, the senior elders were 
outnumbered by the more numerous Iseuri and Ilkitoip who were not only younger and stronger 
but who comprised the larger part of the ten member group ranch committee.  
Remarkably, the elders did not evoke their powers to curse those that went against their 
wishes because their ￿sons￿ continuously appealed to them about the gains of subdivison. Their 
official sons are the Ilkiseiya, the right hand or older grouping within the Ilkitoip age set. Father-
son relationships across age sets serve to solidify inter-age set relationships. While proximate age 
sets struggle against each other for power, leadership and community recognition, alternate age 
sets usually separated by a minimum of fourteen years are characterized by a supportive, though 
paternalistic relationship characterized by deference for the older age set. Within an age-set, on 
the other hand, individuals enjoy bonds that are cordial and mutually reinforcing; solidarity is a 
fundamental organizing principle. Thus the Ilkiseiya, the recognized ￿sons￿ of the Ilnyankusi, 
many of who were in favor of subdivision, appealed for their ￿fathers￿ blessings at many barazas  
that were convened by the group committee to discuss subdivision. As it were, these meetings 
seemed to have been an exercise in public relations designed to contain the disapproval of the 
seniors because their will was virtually ignored. The Iseuri and the Ilkiseiya, who were the 
younger, more numerous and most powerful elders on the group ranch, got the subdivision that 
they preferred.  
                                                 
8 As specified by the group ranch Act of 1968, all group ranch decisions must be made in the presence of a quorum 
comprising at least 60 percent of the total membership, and more, that any individual decision must be put to a vote 




The preference for subdivision by the Ilnyankusi elders in Meto and Nentanai departs 
radically from the ￿conservatism￿ expressed by the Ilnyankusi of Enkaroni.  
The Ilnyankusi of Meto and Nentanai favored subdivision. Their preference for 
subdivision in these two cases was conditioned on the fact that members of their age set own the 
numerous individual ranches surrounding Meto and Nentanai group ranches. They felt that their 
peers who had obtained individual ranches had cheated them out of their land. Most regretted 
their earlier choices of not taking individual ranches when they were up for grabs. Here, the 
Ilnyankusi that disfavored subdivision were few and did not matter. Some disfavor until now, 
though at the time of subdivision they wisely recognized that it would still happen and chose not 
to resist.  
The remaining groups of elders, the Iseuri and Ilkiseyia were much in favor of 
subdividing. Both these age sets had good representation within the group￿s management 
committee. For the Iseuri and the Ilkiseyia a key motivator was the need to ￿develop￿ following 
the example of the individual ranchers. Each of the individuals envisioned a greater security with 
subdivision and the ability to make independent decisions with regard to cultivation, livestock 
management and in the development of infrastructure and housing.  
 
Rich and Poor Livestock Herders 
The rich and the poor, who also belong to the different age sets, can also be grouped into 
preference categories. The rich, who own large numbers of livestock/cattle, initially disfavored 
subdivision. Their large herds would not be sustained under smaller sized parcels. Free grazing 
of their herds within the group ranch made them the disproportionate beneficiaries of the group 




The poor on the other hand favored subdividing, though some expressed a ￿fear￿ of the 
rich whom they anticipated would influence decisions and acquire larger parcels during the 
process of subdivision. The livestock-poor individuals were interested in the transition primarily 
because they did not have large herds. Restricted grazing within the confines of their individual 
parcels was expected to enable them to better manage their small herds. Subdivision would also 
open up new income generating opportunities for the poor. They could lease excess pastures to 
the rich, and benefit from milking the herds of the rich as they grazed in the leased pastures. 
They could also cultivate. They could sell charcoal, or even a part of their land. Subdivision 
would thus create avenues for livestock poor individuals to generate much needed income from 
alternative activities and uplift their status within the community. Thus in spite of the shadow of 
a possible land grab by the rich herd owners during subdivision, the poor had considerable 
incentives to support the drive for subdivision.  
 
The Women 
Since women were not registered as group ranch members, they did not have decision-
making powers. Women acquired rights through their relationships with males either as wives, 
daughters or sisters. Women in the studied group ranches thus did not participate in the decision 
of whether or not to subdivide.  They ￿followed their husbands decisions￿ or ￿took their 
husbands stand.￿  Those that attempted to confront their husbands over the issue were met with 
indifference and sometimes outright hostility. Widows, as the executors of their deceased 
husbands￿ shares in the group ranch were sometimes permitted to attend group ranch members￿ 
meetings but they were not allowed to address men publicly. Several widows did not attend the 
meetings because their in-laws represented them. However their votes counted when time came 




their deceased husbands, helped contain the numbers problem. Instead of registering the adult 
sons, it was more convenient to register widows, who in turn would distribute to their sons.  
Women had no forum within the structures of the group ranch to pursue and articulate 
their interests and claims. They did not attempt to challenge the basis of their exclusion. The 
same elders who had crafted the rule to exclude them could not be relied upon to change the 
rules in their favor. Though women were denied participation, it did not deprive them of a 
preference and an opinion regarding subdivision. 
Many married women favored subdivision on several grounds: inheritance for children, 
land ownership and freedom to conduct independent decisions.  The few that were wary of 
subdivision cited restricted access to grazing and a breakdown of shared life patterns as 
constraints. Their lack of involvement in the process may also have colored their opinion against 
subdivision. Today, these same women that disfavored subdivision are even more resentful of 
subdivision; not only have the conflicts over trespass increased, but inconveniences to their daily 
lives have increased. Subdivision has made their daily provisioning activities even more difficult. 
While before they had the entire group ranch to draw on for fuel wood, a woman is now forced 
to get fuel wood from a finite source within the confines of her parcel. Parcel owners have also 
sealed off the usual, shorter access routes to water. Married women with young sons were 
particularly opposed, as they knew their children had no chances of being included in the 
exercise. 
The widows favored subdivision because it would allow them to become landowners 
through the inheritance of their deceases husbands￿ shares in the group ranch. This would 
ultimately give them some independence and control within the group ranch and their sons￿ 





The Youth: Struggles for Inclusion 
In this study, youth are defined as those male individuals that had not yet been initiated 
into elder-hood but had been initiated into adulthood through circumcision by the time the 
process of subdivision begun in the group ranches of Enkaroni, Meto, Nentanai and Torosei
9. 
When subdivision issues were being discussed in mid 1980s and by the time members resolved 
to subdivide into individual parcels, several groups of youths in these ranches were eligible for 
registration as members. These were the Ilkingonde of Enkaroni, the Ilkingonde of Meto, some 
Ilkishili (also=Ilkingonde) of Torosei and the Irang Irang of Nentanai. In all sections of the 
Maasai, the IrangIrang (referred to as Ng￿orisho among the Matapato) are the immediate seniors 
of the Ilkingonde. 
These sets of youths favored the idea of subdivision for very much the same promise of 
individual progress and development suggested by individual land ownership. Perhaps even 
more significant was the measure of independence from their fathers that the individual 
ownership of land promised. Maasai youths are typically reliant on their fathers for the initial 
acquisition of cattle and other stock to start them off in the livestock enterprise. This dominance 
by older folk is evident in other spheres of an individual￿s lifetime, such as in the rites of 
passage. The younger is often at a less powerful end of an increasing power continuum. Land, a 
basic resource in the livestock enterprise is highly valued. The youth saw in land ownership the 
ability to divest themselves, at least in an economic sense, of part of the hold their fathers, and 
ultimately elders, had over them. The urge to break away was all the more pressing due to the 
                                                 
9 Interviews across all group ranches studied indicated that circumcision was one of the requirements for 
registration. Galaty indicates that though this is a reasonable characterization for the current purpose, the notion of 
￿becoming a man￿ is a process, defined by several sequential events, circumcision being just one out of these. 
Personal communication, 26




polygynous structure of most Maasai households. Not all wives in a polygamous household were 
treated equally; and the probability of disfavor trickling down to children could not be 
discounted. It was not unlikely that such disfavor would manifest itself in the distribution of 
assets from father to sons. Even though the youths favored subdivision they were excluded from 
membership and subsequently an avenue through which they, by right, would have acquired a 
critical productive asset.  
Though the excluded age sets varied somewhat, the basis of their exclusion was 
remarkably consistent across all group ranches: increasing the number of members would reduce 
the size of parcels that each would ultimately receive. The perception of the severity of the 
problem also varied depending on the group ranch. That the IrangIrang age set, relatively more 
advanced age wise, was excluded in Nentanai is an indication of a more acute version of the 
problem. The small size of this group ranch made the range of whom to include even more 
restrictive.  
The exclusion of youths in these group ranches did not go unchallenged. They argued 
that land in traditional customary practice belonged to all, access being conferred to adult males 
via their membership in the community rather than by inheritance from their fathers. As such, 
they were well within their rights to demand for registration. They subsequently organized to 
challenge their exclusion, and did this using various avenues both internal and external to the 
community. They sought the intervention of the elders, of the local administration, of 






4.  DISCUSSION 
The events outlined here demonstrate that individuals and groups will seek to alter 
property rights in their anticipation of net gains from a new structure. To the group ranch 
members, the benefits expected in the new, individualized property rights structure outweigh the 
costs of transforming the old as well as the additional costs of maintaining the new structure. 
This new property rights structure also promises to eliminate disadvantages that were present in 
the status quo property rights. Table 2 suggests that group ranch members￿ preferences for 
subdivision were consistently high regardless of whether or not a group ranch was close to the 
main livestock market or of its size and membership. Meto group ranch for example was distant 
from Ilbissel market and was relatively large in terms of membership yet close more than 80 
percent of its members favored subdivision. The cost and benefit structure was similar for each 
of the four group ranches.  
The costs and benefits as well as risks of institutional change were however not 
homogenous within each group ranch owing to the differentiated structure of group ranch 
communities. For the excluded youths and women, the costs of institutional change outweighed 
the benefits as it created new uncertainties with regard to future access to productive resources. 
As a result, the youth contested their exclusion and used diverse forums to articulate and press 
their claims. Women on the other hand, lacking a forum to articulate their preferences, 
disengaged from the process. Rules created to exclude women had a cultural basis, which they 
were neither ready nor equipped to challenge. 
In the case of the livestock-poor individuals, the costs of organizing to transform property 
rights and subsequently to defend the new rights were outweighed by the promise of specific 




such as leasing pastures and cultivating, accessing capital markets by using titles as collateral, 
and the management of individual herds in tune with pasture resources thus eliminating or 
reducing the need to migrate during dry spells.  
The incentive structure of the wealthy herd owners is unclear. Though they disfavored 
subdivision because restricted access to pastures would threaten the viability of their large herds, 
they did not organize to alter the direction of decision making. That individuals who would 
logically be most disadvantaged by change, and who had the resources and influence to delay or 
deter change, made no effort to do so is curious. The outcome of change evidenced by the 
distribution of land parcels, greatly favored these individuals (Mwangi 2003b). The prior 
negotiation of such an outcome may have accounted for the wealthy cattle keepers￿ seemingly 
stoic acceptance of change. 
The conditions that influenced individual benefit-cost calculations are consistent with 
predictions made by property rights theorists, and which were outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter. Land titles issued by the state upon completing subdivision would be used by 
individuals to access capital markets that were previously inaccessible to them. By freeing 
capital and creating opportunities for investment, titles are ultimately expected to increase the 
value of land. In this regard, titles can also be viewed as lowering the cost of obtaining 
development credit. In addition, the title as a symbol of ownership security, acts as a signal to 
potential buyers who do not have local knowledge (Alston et al. 1996). It thus broadens the land 
market to remote purchasers beyond local buyers. 
Population growth, typified by the progressive increase of group ranch members and an 
almost automatic recruitment of groups of maturing youth, was an important motivator for 




By increasing resource scarcity population pressure enhanced the value of the resource. 
Individuals then found it beneficial to invest resources in meeting the costs of privatization. 
The group ranch, like all collective goods, was subject to various kinds of incentive 
problems that created high governance costs for collective organization. Because in the 
traditional indigenous Maasai system livestock are individually owned and managed, the 
￿symbolic￿ function of cattle as well as a need to maximize family welfare in a relatively risky 
environment, created an incentive for rational herders to accumulate livestock. The group ranch 
committee, mandated with the management and administration of the group ranch, was unable to 
enforce livestock quotas and impose limits on grazing capacities. This would have gone against 
traditional values. More importantly, the committee, being wealthy herd owners themselves 
would likely not have acted against their own self-interest. Consequently the size of herds went 
unregulated, with wealthy herd owners reaping disproportionate benefits from the collective and 
the livestock-poor shouldering the uncompensated costs of collective grazing.  
These grazing externalities imposed on the poor by the wealthy, most pronounced during 
drought, undermined the provisioning abilities of poor herders, undermined the reproduction of 
pastoral livelihoods and negatively affected herders￿ incomes. The grazing of individual 
ranchers￿ herds in the group domain only served to exacerbate the problem. Sanctioning the 
politically influential individual ranchers may not have been in the best interests of the 
committee. Thus both wealthy herd owners and individual ranchers became an externality that 
poor herders could no longer ignore. Since with private property the potential yields and profit 
expectations can be attributed exclusively to the individual, a strong incentive was created for the 
livestock poor individual to support group ranch subdivision. This would eliminate the costs of 




as those incurred to reach collective agreement and to organize a community of users. The 
opportunistic tendencies of members to circumvent rules, for example when they cultivated, or 
constructed settlements in prohibited areas, or when they invited their friends to graze in the 
group ranch, further increased the costs of governance. 
The motivational factors suggested by this study such as land scarcity, failures of 
collective decision making, new income opportunities conform fairly well with theoretical 
expectation. However, individuals were also confronted with a declining security of tenure over 
their lands, particularly when viewed in the context of land appropriations conducted earlier in 
the colonial period. This uncertainty in ensuring the security of Maasai tenure created a risk that 
made the transition to individual units seem more rational to the Maasai.  
Thus even though the transformation of property rights in land, may be triggered by 
changes in relative prices and other factors within the economic sphere, it is also a  political 
strategy for securing control and the process of change a political process that  involves struggles  
among diverse actors who are embedded within local socio-cultural structures.   In the end this 
political process yields beneficial outcomes for those with access to decision making, while 
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Figure 1--Location of Kajiado district 
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